Wednesday, June 4, 2014

High-Frequency Trading Goes Fairly To Highest Bidder? (After Charges of Running a Price-Fixing Cartel on Nasdaq in the 90s, Wall Street Banks Are Now Trading Their Own Stocks in Darkness)

And you thought the banks' behavior was going to improve after the fines?

Obviously the fines were just the opening shot in the new "fixed game for the banks" scheme.

It's a great deal.


They pay a percentage of their profits to the regularly outraged regulators, and commence to do it again.

But this time even bigger and more blatantly (and much darker).

Let's see them catch us now, they seem to be saying.

Doing god's work . . . .

Of course.

After reading Tim Geithner's self-serving (almost grandiose) verbiage about how they saved the market, I thought it would be useful if not just incredibly comic, to review the history of what happened before and after the epic financial disaster culminating in 2008 (we are still hoping).

It's like now that our money isn't worth much of anything anymore, we don't really mind that they continue to rip us off with wide-eyed understanding smiles (during "public" hearings).

Was That Really a Public Meeting on High-Frequency Trading?

By Pam Martens: June 4, 2014
Scott D. O'Malia, CFTC Commissioner
The regulator in charge of policing high-frequency trading in the futures markets, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), held a “public meeting” yesterday to determine if the allegations raised in the Michael Lewis book, Flash Boys, relating to high-frequency traders rigging the stock market might also be occurring in the futures markets.
As is increasingly typical of the U.S. markets themselves, the public was nowhere to be found at this “public meeting” yesterday. There was no one speaking on behalf of a consumer federation; no one speaking on behalf of disenfranchised small farmers who hedge their crops in these markets; no one speaking on behalf of the union employee or teacher or public municipal worker who is watching their retirement plan assets fleeced on millions of trades daily by high-frequency traders who have obtained a litany of high-speed perks, rebates and tricked up order types at U.S. exchanges.
What we heard were the overtly defensive voices of the executives from the two major futures exchanges and their very supportive staff. Based on missing coverage this morning in the media, it does not appear that any major business media turned out for this “public meeting” other than possibly the Financial Times which carried a brief mention.
One person whom the CFTC may have asked to stand in for the public was Joe Saluzzi, co-founder of Themis Trading and an expert on needed reforms in the area of high-frequency trading in the stock market. But because the stock market and futures market are vastly different animals, Saluzzi was decidedly a fish out of water at yesterday’s meeting.
CFTC Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia opened the meeting saying that “Michael Lewis’s book has stirred up quite a debate about high-frequency trading…” O’Malia said he wanted to “address these issues directly and have a frank discussion with all of you to understand how automated and high-frequency trading impacts derivatives markets.”
O’Malia said he had asked the panelists to address “fees and rebate programs, order types, and co-location policies.” Unfortunately, there was no frank discussion, whatsoever, on these critically problematic areas and that was because no one representing the public was present to press the panelists to come clean.
Bryan Durkin, Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME), which operates the largest futures market in the world, used the same subterfuge that his CME boss, Terrence Duffy, Executive Chairman and President of the CME Group, deployed before the U.S. Senate Agriculture Committee on May 13.
Duffy testified to the Senate Committee that “Our market data is sent to everyone at once. While customers have several options in terms of how they can receive data from us, we do not restrict access. Having multiple connectivity options makes our markets accessible to a broader array of participants.”
The speed at which traders receive their data from the CME depends on where the traders’ computers are located. Exchanges, including the CME, are now selling the right to locate one’s computers inside the exchange’s computer facilities (co-location) to gain a competitive edge over other slower traders. Duffy justified the practice as follows in his Senate testimony:
“Another service that CME Group provides to the marketplace is co-location. The criticism of co-location in some of the public coverage of this issue has failed to recognize that co-location actually equalizes access to the benefits of speed through proximity. It used to be that the benefit of speed from proximity was available only to traders who could buy real estate near an exchange, or where he or she thought the server would be… Everyone in our facility connects with the same length wire, so there are no unequal location advantages. This is one of the true benefits of our co-location services.”
What the CME refuses to talk about is its discriminatory pricing practices which constitute the core of the debate. CME’s co-location pricing plan is available at this link. It shows an eight-tiered market based on the participant’s ability to pay CME $144,000 a year for super-fast speed declining to $6,000 a year at the bottom rung of the speed chain. Each higher rung of the pricey chain is permitting the fleecing of the slower traders on the lower, cheaper rungs.
Because exchanges in the United States are permitted to function as self-regulatory bodies, they are mandated under law to provide a level playing field to all comers.
Another subject discussed by Duffy before the U.S. Senate came up yesterday. Senator Sherrod Brown had probed Duffy on high-frequency traders getting ahead of other participants by receiving confirmations of their own trades which are not recorded on the CME’s data feed until later.
Senator Brown:  “As we know the world of high-speed trading time is measured in microseconds (millionths of a second) or milliseconds (thousandths of a second)… The Wall Street Journal highlighted ‘order latency’ when trade information is routed to the parties to a trade before they post to the rest of the market.

This informational advantage, if you will, allows high-speed trading firms to see which way prices are heading, as you know, and trade ahead of the rest of the market on a different futures exchange, exploiting arbitrage opportunities in mere milliseconds.”
Duffy had responded to that charge as follows:
Duffy:  “All of our market data comes out of one pipe sir. And then the way you decide to acquire that is up to you. So there’s multiple ways to receive market data. So it does go out all at once. What you’re referring to, I believe, in the Wall Street Journal article that was written over a year and a half ago is where a participant would receive his confirmation of a trade but the market data did not hit the tape yet. So he knew he had the trade, he was the only one who knew he had the trade, the rest of the world didn’t know he had the trade yet. That was what the Wall Street Journal article cited. We have shrunk that latency dramatically about market data to market confirmation.”
Yesterday, the CME hauled in one of its staffers to discuss the trade confirmation issue. The presentation was so convoluted it clarified absolutely nothing.
One piece of big news did come out of the hearing:  according to the CFTC, the futures exchanges have increased the “incentive” programs they offer to various market participants and high-frequency traders from 56 to 340 programs. But, again, the public was left in the dark at this meeting about what these incentive programs actually do.
Wall Street On Parade located one incentive program which was submitted to the CFTC by CME on May 15 of this year. The program, which started on March 14, 2011 was being revised to extend to June 30, 2015. Below are excerpts of the plan:
The purpose of this Program is to incent(ivize) market makers to enhance liquidity in the products listed below. The resulting increase in central limit order book liquidity on the CME Globex® Platform benefits all participants segments in the market.
Product Scope
CME E-Mini S&P Select Sector Index futures products traded on Globex® (‘Products’).
Volume Commitment. CME may terminate a Tier 1 Market Maker if it fails to account for at least five percent (5%) of aggregate electronic volume in the Products on a monthly basis.
Tier 1: Fee Waivers. CME Clearing and CME Globex fees waived for all Tier 1 Market Makers in the Program. Performance Stipend. Tier 1 Market Makers will receive a monthly stipend for performing their obligations.
Tier 2:  Fee Waivers. CME Clearing and CME Globex fees waived for all Tier 2 Market Makers in the Program.
Tier 1 and 2: Incentive Pool. During each full month of participation in the Program, Tier 1 and Tier 2 participants may be eligible to participant in a predetermined incentive pool.
As Wall Street On Parade has suggested previously, if Congress genuinely hopes to get at the facts and the truth about our rigged markets, and convey the information to the public in language it can understand, both the Senate and the House must hire a Special Counsel who knows how to speak in plain language and has a deep background in the securities and futures markets to conduct its public hearings. The Senate appointed Ferdinand Pecora to do the job after the 1929 crash and ensuing Great Depression. Pecora issued subpoenas and demanded testimony under oath for two years. It’s well past the time to start this process.

After Charges of Running a Price Fixing Cartel on Nasdaq in the 90s, Wall Street Banks Are Now Trading Their Own Stocks in Darkness

By Pam Martens and Russ Martens: June 3, 2014

On July 17, 1996, the U.S. Justice Department charged the biggest names on Wall Street, names like Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan and predecessor firms to Citigroup, with pricing fixing on the electronic stock market known as Nasdaq.

The Justice Department felt the firms were so untrustworthy to make a fair electronic marketplace that as part of its settlement it required that some traders’ phone calls be tape recorded when making Nasdaq trades and it gave itself the right to randomly show up and listen in on the traders’ calls. The scandal made headlines for years and revealed that the price fixing had been going on under the unwatchful eye of regulators for more than a decade.

Now, more than six years after the greatest Wall Street crash since 1929, the public is still learning stomach-churning details about the lingering effects of de-regulating Wall Street.

Yesterday we learned that the very same Wall Street firms charged with price fixing in the 90s have somehow conned their regulators into allowing them to own their own dark pools – effectively unregulated stock exchanges – and make markets in the stock of their very own Wall Street bank.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) – a self-regulatory Wall Street body (which under a previous name was responsible for missing the Nasdaq price fixing for more than a decade) released trading data yesterday for the dark pools operating the week of May 12 – 16. This was the first time such data has been released. The data releases are set to continue.

There are three major concerns that are immediately raised by the trading statistics:  that Wall Street banks are allowed to make a market in their own stock inside an unregulated dark pool; that the other largest banks are making large markets in each other’s stocks; and why the public is just seeing a sliver of sunshine – instead of what went on in the previous 51 weeks or prior years of trading in these dark pools? Since the Wall Street firms knew this public data release was coming, it’s possible that higher trading volumes were previously occurring in their own and each other’s stocks.

Bank of America’s trading arm, Merrill Lynch, owns two dark pools, one of which is Instinct X. Last evening, FINRA data showed that during the relevant week Merrill’s dark pool, Instinct X, traded 8,207,150 shares of its own parent’s stock in a total of 16,246 trades. Merrill is now stating that it provided erroneous numbers to FINRA and the figure is really just 4,103,575 shares and 8,123 trades. A second Merrill Lynch dark pool, which goes by the letters MLVX, last evening showed it traded in its company stock to the tune of 66,200 shares in 94 trades. This morning, those figures have been cut in half.

Citigroup, which became insolvent during the 2008 crisis and required multiple bailouts from the taxpayer, owns a total of four dark pools according to a list posted at the SEC’s web site – none of which the general public has ever heard of:  LavaFlow, LIQUIFI, Citi Credit Cross and Citi Cross. (The more dark pools a Wall Street firm owns the greater the concern that it could be trading between these pools to effectively paint the tape, i.e., manipulate the price of a stock.) Dark pools match buyers and sellers in the dark, without disclosing the bids and offers to the public marketplace.

According to FINRA data for the relevant week, Citigroup’s dark pool, LavaFlow, traded 645,756 shares of Citigroup stock in 1,838 trades while Citi Cross traded another 39,997 in 256 trades.

Merrill Lynch’s dark pool, Instinct X, has dramatically changed its data as to what it traded in Citigroup stock for the referenced week:  last night it showed it was the largest trader among the dark pools in Citigroup stock with total shares traded of 1,791,492 in 10,282 trades. This morning those figures have been cut exactly in half, making it the seventh largest share volume trader in Citigroup for the referenced week among the dark pools. Ranking above it in share volume are, in order, the dark pools of Credit Suisse (CrossFinder), Deutsche Bank (DBAX), UBS, Goldman Sachs (Sigma-X), Barclays (LATS) and Morgan Stanley (MSPL).

Data for the same week for JPMorgan shows its dark pool, JPM-X, traded 826,614 shares of its own stock in 1,483 trades. JPMorgan ranked seventh among the dark pools for trading in its stock that week with the following dark pools trading a million or more shares of JPMorgan:  Credit Suisse’s CrossFinder (1.9 million); UBS (1.57 million); Barclays LATS (1.15 million); Deutsche Bank’s DBAX (1.12 million); Goldman Sachs’ Sigma-X (1.07 million). Three of Citigroup’s dark pools — LavaFlow, LIQUIFI and Citi Cross — traded a total of 939,072 shares in JPMorgan.

Another serious concern that has arisen since the release of the book, Flash Boys, by bestselling author Michael Lewis, is the introduction of tricked up order types that let high-frequency traders fleece the ordinary investor along with revelations that exchanges and dark pools are now offering payment for order flow and other cash incentives to attract trades from high-frequency traders.

On September 22, 2009, Citigroup released the following press release concerning a new order type and rebate program at LavaFlow:

Citi’s LavaFlow ECN has introduced a new order type, Hide to Comply, an execution instruction that allows liquidity providers to enter displayable limit orders at aggressive prices and obtain the best possible time priority at the order’s posted price level, all while receiving a rebate.

“Hide to Comply adjusts aggressively priced orders such that they are hidden on entry, and their limit price set to the opposite side of the national best bid and offer (NBBO). While hidden at this price, the order will be eligible for a full rebate. When the NBBO updates such that the order is no longer at a locking price, the order will be displayed at this new limit, maintaining its original time priority; the order will not be re-priced.”

We have asked the SEC to weigh in on how Wall Street banks, which caused the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression, are allowed to make markets in their own stocks. We’ll update this article when we hear back.

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